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I. INTRODUCTION
First of all, we must move more aggressively to utilize the vast coal reserves in our country.

President Jimmy Carter.'
The current federal coal. program celebrates its twentieth anniversary on August 4, 1996. Aside from the mining of valuable mineral
deposits from federal lands, an area so weathered that time has little
meaning, the federal coal program stands almost alone as lasting longer
than the other principal federal resource/energy programs. In 1987, for
example, Congress amended the Mineral Leasing Act by passing the
Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987.2 The Geothermal Steam Act of 1970' was amended with the passage of the
Geothermal Steam Act Amendments of 1988.' And in 1992, Congress
addressed various programs in the Energy Policy Act, including
coalbed methane, oil shale, and federal lignite royalties in the Fort
Union area of North Dakota.5 That we even speak separately of a federal coal program, an oil and gas program, a geothermal program and
a hardrock mineral program is quite telling. The reason has more to do
with history than anything else. It reflects piecemeal congressional
responses to particular interests and issues as they developed. 6
Currently, the antiquated hardrock mineral program is receiving
national scrutiny.' Not so with the federal coal program, which still

1. President Jimmy Carter, The President's News Conference of April 10, 1979,
Week. Comp. Pres. Doe. 648 (1979).
2. Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330. See generally Patricia J. Beneke, The Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987: A Legislative History and Analysis, 4

J. MiN. L. & POL'Y 11 (1988); Thomas L. Sansonetti & William R. Murray, A Primer on
the Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987 and Its Regulations, 25

LAND & WATER L. REV. 375 (1990). Five years earlier Congress had enacted the Federal
Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1757 (1994). In 1981,
Congress passed the Combined Hydrocarbon Leasing Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-78, 95
Stat. 1070 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 226(b)(1) (1994)).
3.

30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1027 (1994).

4. Pub. L. No. 100-443, 102 Stat. 1766 (1988).
5. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
6. For an interesting insight into the events surrounding the development of oil and
gas regulation, see Laura Lindley, Of Teapot Dome, Wind River and Fort Chaffee: Federal
Oil and Gas Resources, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 21 (1995).
7. See generally JOHN D. LESHY, TIM MNING LAW: A STUDY IN PERPETUAL MO-
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operates in accordance with the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act
of 1975 (FCLAA).8 The longevity of FCLAA is remarkable, but
whether it reflects a sound policy that will carry us into the next century is an issue worth exploring. This article attempts to lay the foundation for such an examination by briefly canvassing the events and
circumstances animating the passage of FCLAA, and then summarizing
the primary provisions and subsequent regulatory implementation of the
Act, with a focus on those aspects of the federal coal program that
were designed to discourage speculation and spur development.
While various provisions of FCLAA reflect the goals of an energy/natural resources policy that flourished in the mid 1970's, how
those policies became translated into particular statutory-and ultimately regulatory-provisions may or may not make sense twenty years
later. This article, therefore, concludes with some preliminary observations about the continued efficacy of FCLAA, tentatively suggesting
that, while in hindsight the underlying concern prompting passage of
FCLAA may be questionable, the anti-speculative and diligence provisions in FCLAA may still serve important natural resource policy objectives.
II. BACKGROUND
The beginning of the federal coal program extends back to the
middle nineteenth century. In 1864, Congress provided for the sale of
coal lands at $20 per acre, later changed, in 1873, to a lesser amount,
depending upon the distance to the nearest railroad tract.9 As a promi-

TION (1987); CHARLES F. WELKiNsoN, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER AND
THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 28-74 (1992).

8. Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083 (1976). Congress passed very limited amendments to FCLAA in 1978 and 1985. Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1090 (1978) (allowing
modification of leases to include an additional 160 acres of contiguous lands, without triggering a readjustment and the accompanying FCLAA requirements); H.R. REP. No. 1635,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1978); see also infra note 58.
9. 13 Stat. 343 (1864), amended by 13 Stat. 529 (1865), revised by Coal Lands Act
of March 3, 1873, 17 Stat. 607 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 71-76 (1994)). See Effie A.
Hard, 44 I.D. 479 (1915); see generally PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW LAND

DEVELOPMENT 724 (1968); BENJAMIN HORACE HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND
POLICIES 518 (1965); see also CELIA CAMPBELL-MOHN, BARRY BREEN & J. WILLIAM
FUTRELL, ENVIRONmENTAL LAW FROM RESOURCES TO RECOvERY 644-47 (1993) [hereinafter

CAMPBELL-MOHN]. The General Land Office Appropriation Act of 1876 required the classification of coal lands, as well as other land categories. HIBBARD, supra at 497. Most of the
coal lands in the east, along the Appalachians, had already passed out of federal ownership.
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nent public land. historian notes, during the latter half of the nineteenth
and early twentieth century, "the fuller recognition of the vital importance of the coal deposits caused a revamping of the coal land
laws."'10 The Secretary of the Interior, for example, beginning in 1906,
withdrew valuable coal lands from entry, at the request of President
Roosevelt who publicly expressed concern over the administration of
such lands." Congress assisted this effort in 1910 when it passed the
Pickett Act, governing the withdrawal of these and other lands." As
of June 30, 1923, almost thirty-five million acres had been withdrawn
west of the 100th meridian. 3 However, in the majority of the remaining areas, coal deposits within lands classified as coal lands could still
be purchased either under the coal land laws upon application or

through a preference system. 4
On February 25, 1920, Congress passed what is now known as the
Mineral Leasing Act (MLA),"5 governing the disposition by lease of
coal and other specified mineral resources, such as oil and gas. The
Id. at 516-17. In many areas, moreover, the railroad land grants created a checkerboard
pattern of federal and non-federal coal lands. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT
TO THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR: COOPERATIVE LEASING OFFERS INcREASED COMPETITION,
REVENUES, AND PRODUCTION FROM FEDERAL COAL LEASES IN WESTERN CHECKERBOARD
LANDS (April 1982).

10.

HIBBARD,

supra note 10, at 517. Coal served as the predominant energy source

from the mid 1880s until the mid-twentieth century. ExECUTIE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
THE NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN 1-2. (1977) [hereinafter NEP]. See also JOHN G. CLARK,
ENERGY AND THE FEDERAL GOvERNmENT: FOSSIL FUEL POLICIES 1900, 3-12 (1987). Coal
production, unable to compete with natural gas and petroleum, declined after the World War
1I.Mel Horwitch, Coal. ConstrainedAbundance, reprintedin REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL, ENERGY FUTURE 82 (Robert Stobaugh & Daniel
Yergin Eds. 1979). See generally A. Dan Tarlock, The Making of Federal Coal Policy:
Lessons for Public Lands Management From a Failed Program, An Essay and Review, 25
NAT. RESOURCES J. 349 (1985).
11. GATES, supra note 9, at 726-30.
12. CAMPBELL-MOHN, supra note 9, at 645; HIBBARD, supra note 9, at 520; GATES,
supra note 9, at 726-30. See also Act of June 22, 1910, § 3, 36 Stat. 583; Act of June 25,
1910, 36 Stat. 847; Agricultural Entries of Coal-Lands Act of June 22, 1910, 39 I.D. 17988 (1910). Cf 30 U.S.C. §§ 81-88, 90 (1994).
13. HIBBARD, supra note 9, at 522.
14. 30 U.S.C. §§ 71-76 (1994); Coal-Land Laws and Regulations Thereunder, 46 I.D.
131 (1917). In 1914, Congress authorized the leasing of coal in Alaska. Act of Oct. 20,
1914, 38 Stat. 741, later amended by Act of March 4, 1921, 41 Stat. 1363, repealed by
Act of July 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 351, amended by Act of Sept 9, 1959, 73 Stat. 490. E.g.,
Alaska Anthracite Coal Co., 44 I.D. 9 (1915).
15. Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 146, ch. 85, 41 Stat 437
(1920).
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MLA authorized the granting of prospecting permits for "unclaimed"
lands. 6 With the passage of the MLA, rights to federal coal could be
obtained only through lease, either competitively or non-competitively
under a preference right system. Where valuable coal deposits were
known to exist in an area, the Interior Department (the Department)
issued leases by competitive coal bidding. In other areas, the Department could exercise its discretionary authority and grant a two year
permit, which could be extended, to engage in coal prospecting over
"unclaimed" and "undeveloped" land. If the prospector discovered coal
and applied for a preference right coal lease, the Department would
issue a lease if it determined that coal had been discovered in "commercial quantities."' 7 From the passage of the MLA until the early
1970s, the Department issued coal leases on a case-by-case basis, without much scrutiny.'8

16. 30 U.S.C. § 201(b), repealed 90 Stat. 1083, 1085. For a discussion of "unclaimed" lands, see M-36393, The Effect of Mining Claims on SecretarialAuthority to Issue
ProspectingPermits for Coal and Phosphates, 84 I.D. 442 (1977), supplemented by 86 I.D.
627 (1979), supplemented by M-36893 (Supp. II), Effect of Mining Claims on Secretarial
Authority to Issue ProspectingPermits and PreferenceRight Leases for Coal and Phosphates
(Modifying Solicitor's Opinion M-36893 of Aug. 2, 1977; and its Supplement of Nov. 19,
1979, Upon the Same Subject): The "Unclaimed, Undeveloped" Issue, 88 I.D. 247 (1981).
This Solicitor's Opinion concluded that a coal prospecting permit could be issued only for
"unclaimed" lands - that is, public lands not already subject to a purportedly valid mining
claim. This conclusion meant that non-competitive preference right leases could be issued
only for such "unclaimed" lands. The 1981 Solicitor's Opinion modified the prior opinions
by concluding that "it is the existence of adverse valid, vested claims or rights at the time
of prospecting permits which is determinative." Solicitor's Opinion M-36893 (Supp. II), supra, at 251.
17. NRDC v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553, 555-56 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Not until May, 1976,
did the Department promulgate regulations defining "commercial quantities." See id. at 555
n.3; see also Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Andrus, 488 F. Supp. 962, 968 (D. Utah 1979). The environmental community was successful in its effort to ensure that the Department complied
with the National Environmental Policy Act and that environmental costs would be considered in the definition of commercial quantities. Berklund, 609 F.2d at 555 n.3, 558. See
also infra note 27.
18. See John D. Leshy, Non-NEPA Legal Aspects of Federal Coal Leasing and Development Policy: An Environmental Attorney's Analysis, 9 NAT. RES. LAW 495, 496 (1976);
John L. Watson, The Federal Coal Follies-A New Program Ends (Begins) A Decade of
Anxiety?, 58 DEN. L. J. 65, 78 (1980). In 1947, Congress passed the Mineral Leasing Act
for Acquired Lands, closing a then existing gap in lands available for coal leasing, 30
U.S.C. §§ 351-359 (1994). For a review of federal coal leasing under the MLA, see generally COLLEGE OF LAW, UNIVERSIY OF UTAH, LEGAL STUDY OF COAL RESOURCES ON
PUBLIC LANDs: PREPARED FOR THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEV CoMMIssioN (1968).
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CONCERN OVER SPECULATIVE FEDERAL COAL HOLDINGS

This virtually unplanned and unsupervised coal leasing program
became a matter of interest, first when Congress and the Department
began focusing on better management and development of public lands
and natural resources, and then even more so once the effects of the
energy crisis became pronounced. 9 During the early 1970s, the Nixon
Administration and Congress expressed concern over the prospect that
large reserves of coal were being held without any evident intention to
develop those reserves. In 1970, the Department prepared a report on
"Holdings and Development of Federal Coal Leases,"2' and proposed
regulations designed to address whether coal production in an area was
likely to occur or whether applicants Were simply tying up considerable
federal land, possibly for speculative purposes.' With over 50% of
the nation's recoverable coal reserves on federal land, this inquiry

19. See generally C. PETER GOPLERUD III, COAL DEVELOPMENT AND USE: THE LEGAL
CONSTRAINTS AND INCENTIVES (1983); DR. ROBERT NELSON, THE MAKING OF FEDERAL
COAL POLICY (1983); Carl E. Bagge, Coal and the Nation's Energy Future, 15 HOus. L.
REV. 1081 (1978); Forum, The New Values of Coal, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 255 (1974); Hon.
Henry M. Jackson, The Role for Greater Coal Utilization for the United States' National
Energy Policy, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 303 (1981); Guy R. Martin, A New Programfor the
Management of Federal Coal Reserves, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 1019 (1980); Hon. James A.
McClure, Energy Independence Through Increased Utilization of American Coal: Goal of the
98th Congress, 86 W. VA. L. REV. 687 (1984); Hon. Jennings Randolph, Coal: The Coming
Decade, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 835 (1980); Gov. John D. Rockefeller IV, A Common Sense
Approach to Coal's Role in Resolving America's Energy Crisis, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 841
(1980); A. Dan Tarlock, Western Coal in Context, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 313 (1981). For a
summary of the coal leasing program in the broader context of natural resource protection
and development in the 1970's, see generally CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., THE BATTLE FOR NATURAL RESOURCES (1983) (CEQ); Frank Gregg, Public Policy: Controversial
Beginningsfor the Third Century, reprintedin GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS:
ESSAYS ON HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT SINCE WORLD WAR II, 41-181 (Michael J. Lacey
Ed. 1991).
20. See GOPLEUD, supra note 19, at 11. An Assistant Secretary for Land and Water
Resources within the Interior Department during the 1970's explained that the Department
had "allowed various companies to .. . take advantage of a loophole in their requirements
to develop and produce continuously and diligently. We allowed them to pay minimal advance royalties in lieu of diligent development." Jack 0. Horton, The Energy Policy Game
The Odds On Independence, 9 NAT. RES. LAW 49, 54 (1976). See also Solicitor's Opinion M-36951, Section 2(a)(2)(A) of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 92 I.D. 537, 551
(1985) (prior to FCLAA, no limit on the number of years allowed to pay advance royalties). Cf.Garland Coal & Mining Co., 88 I.D. 24 (1981) (discussing effect of failure to pay
annual rental under old leases).
21. 35 Fed. Reg. 3815 (1970).
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became even more important during the ensuing energy crisis when
attention focused on these untapped federal coal reserves.22 In short,
as Mel Horwitch succinctly stated, "[c]oal ha[d] been rediscovered."'
In 1971, the Secretary of Interior imposed an informal moratorium
on the issuance of any further coal leases or prospecting permits until
the Department could develop a more structured program.24 The moratorium became formalized in 1973, with the issuance of Secretarial
Order No. 2952.25 This gave the Department time to develop a new

22. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, HOLDINGS
AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL COAL LEASES (1970); 5 COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES
No. 1, LEASED AND LOST (1974). For example, western federal coal production in 1973 was
half of the total western federal production only five years later. See Watson, supra note 18,
at 74. In 1980, John Watson observed that:
[t]he United States has more energy potential lying within its borders than the total
of world oil resources. . . [C]oal makes up the greatest portion of that resource
base and will undoubtedly be perceived as the most readily attainable answer to
our energy woes, particularly over the next fifteen to twenty years.
Id. at 76. Between 1945 and 1970, the United States leased over 700,000 acres and had
somewhere in the range of 470,000 acres subject to prospecting permits, for a combined
potential of 250 billion tons of federal coal, while federal production in 1970 was only at
7.4 million tons of coal. See Leo M. Krulitz, Management of Federal Coal Resources, 24
ROCKY MIN. MIN. L. INST. 139, 141 (1978). See also Donald L. Humphreys, Existing Federal Coal Leaseholds - How Strong is the Hold?, 25 ROCKY MTN: MIN. L. INST. 5-1
(1979). The majority of federal coal leases were issued between 1960 and 1970. See Federal
Coal Leasing Policies and Regulations; Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978) [hereinafter Federal Coal Leasing Policies].
23. Horwitch, supra note 10, at 79. Writing in 1979, Horwitch also warned that "[t]he
so-called transition to coal . . . may prove difficult, if it is possible at all. True, the United
States has an abundance of coal. But coal in turn has an abundance of problems." Id. at 81.
24. See Federal Coal Leasing Policies, supra note 22, at 7.
25. 38 Fed. Reg. 4682 (1973). See Watson, supra note 18, at 78. New leases would
be issued where the coal reserves were shown to meet an existing market demand or where
the proposed lessee intended to develop the reserves within three years. Id. This limited
leasing led the Department to become embroiled in litigation involving its authority to deny
a prospecting permittee either an extension of such a permit or a preference right lease, as
well as what test to apply when making such a determination. See supra note 17 and accompanying text discussing prospecting permits. Courts held that applications for new prospecting permits could be rejected. E.g., Krueger v. Morton, 539 F.2d 235 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Hunter v. Morton, 529 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1976); American Nuclear Co. v. Andrus, 434 F.
Supp. 1035 (D. Wyo. 1977). Conversely, however, applications for extensions of prospecting
permits had to be processed. E.g., Peabody Coal Co. v. Andrus, 477 F. Supp. 120 (D.
Wyo. 1979) (although the court's opinion appears to emphasize BLM's practice and apparent
policy of processing such applications). Holders of prospecting permits could be denied preference right coal leases, unless they found coal in "commercial quantities" - a test not formalized in regulations until May 1976. See, e.g., NRDC v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925
(D.D.C. 1978), affid, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Andrus, 488 F.
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federal coal program, as well as to prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) in accordance with the newly enacted National Environmental Policy Act.26 The final EIS was released in 1975, with Secretary Kleppe proposing in January of the following year a new and
ultimately short-lived federal coal leasing program called the Energy
Minerals Activity Recommendation System (EMARS II), a wholly
competitive leasing system."
Concurrently with EMARS II, the Secretary also announced the
development of the Coal Programmatic EIS, the creation of the Northern Great Plains resource program, revisions to the coal regulations,
including specific diligence requirements, and a process for consultation
with the western states' governors and their staff. 8 The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) challenged the EIS on EMARS II for
its failure to address the need for additional federal coal leasing. 9 The

Supp. 976 (D. Colo. 1980); Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Andrus, 488 F. Supp. 962 (D. Utah 1980).
See generally Richard B. Johns, Federal Preference Right Coal Leases: How Much "Right"
Really Exists, 12 NAT. RESOURCES LAW 389 (1979). For a description of the Interior
Department's leasing activities during this period, see generally Carl E. Bagge, Setting National Coal Policy: Interaction Between Congress, Regulatory Agencies and the Courts, 86
W. VA. L. REv. 717 (1984); Thomas E. Ebzery & Brent R. Kunz, Federal Coal Leasing in
the 1980s - Lessons Learned From the 1970s, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 315 (1983);
Krulitz, supra note 22, at 139; Martin, supra note 19; Brian E. McGee & Gerald E. Dahl,
The Federal Coal Leasing Waltz, 80 W. VA. L. REV. 455 (1978). See also supra note 17.
26. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988).
27. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, ENViRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: PROPOSED FEDERAL COAL LEASING PROGRAM (1975). Prior to
EMARS II, the Department proposed the Energy Minerals Allocation Recommendation System [hereinafter EMARS I], which had focused on government identification of appropriate
leasing tracts, while EMARS II emphasized private 'sector tract identification. See generally
Federal Coal Leasing Policies, supra note 28, at 90-93, 97-103 (reprinting the Department
of Interior's new coal policy and responses to the General Accounting Office's report on
federal coal resources).
28. Federal Coal Leasing Policies, supra note 22, at 7-8.
29. NRDC v. ttughes, 437 F. Supp. 981 (D.D.C. 1977), amended, 454 F. Supp. 148
(D.D.C. 1978). According to then Solicitor Krulitz, the Department expected the decision in
Hughes, but not the sweeping injunction. Krulitz, supra note 22, at 142. Of course, the
Department had already prevailed in Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976), where the
Supreme Court upheld the Department's initial decision not to prepare a regional EIS; yet,
by the time the Court decided Kleppe, the Department had proposed initiating the type of
regional activity at issue in that case. See Krulitz, supra note 22, at 177. Because the Department had anticipated the Hughes decision, efforts were "well underway in developing a
new leasing program for which . . . [it] would prepare a sound and legally adequate impact
statement." Federal Coal Leasing Policies, supra note 22, at 11 n.15 (quoting Secretary
Cecil Andrus).
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court agreed and issued a fairly sweeping injunction, modified soon
thereafter, ordering the preparation of a supplemental EIS adequately
addressing a "no action" alternative."
Along with its review of the leasing program, the Department
from 1974 through 1976 sought to establish rules under Section 7 of
the MLA governing diligent development and a requirement for continuous operation. 3' These policies became an element of Secretary
Kleppe's new coal program, EMARS II, announced in 1976.32 The
Department explained that the MLA required diligent development and
continued operation, which necessarily required some standard for the
rate of production over a certain time period.33 The Department apparently believed that a forty-year period was an appropriate time
frame for exhausting recoverable reserves, and it further believed that
the forty-year period could apply to a "logical mining unit" (LMU),
which could include a single or more than one federal coal lease, as
well as non-federal coal.34

30. The parties ultimately settled the lawsuit, agreeing to a modification of the court's
decree. See Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Andrus, 488 F. Supp. 962, 973 (D. Utah 1979); Ebzery &
Kunz, supra note 25, at 320-23. Amidst this litigation, the Department placed a high priority
on developing a new program, subsequently announced in 1979. See Martin, supra note 19,
at 1030-31. This new program followed FCLAA, and "it relied on federal coal production
goals [based upon Department of Energy generated estimates], the bureau's land-use planning
process, and regional coal teams made up of state and federal officials." CEQ, supra note
20, at 91.
31. 39 Fed. Reg. 43,229 (Dec. 11, 1974) (proposed logical mining unit rules for "diligent development" and "continuous operation"); 40 Fed. Reg. 60,070 (Dec. 31, 1975)
(same); 41 Fed. Reg. 2948 (Jan. 19, 1976) (proposed rules for defining "commercial quantities" and "valuable deposit" for preference right leases); 41 Fed. Reg. 18,845 (May 7,
1976) (final rule for issuance of preference right leases); 41 Fed. Reg. 21,779 (May 28,
1976) (final logical mining unit rules for "diligent development" and "continuous operation");
41 Fed. Reg. 45,571 (Oct. 15, 1976) (requesting comments on "diligent development" and
"continued operation" rules after FCLAA); 41 Fed. Reg. 56,643 (Dec. 29, 1976) (final rules
after FCLAA). The pre-1970 Coal Lease form 3130-1 included a clause that provided that
leases would continue "upon condition of diligent development and continued operation of
the mine or mines" (with exceptions), and that operations either would be continuous or the
lessee would pay an advance royalty. Cf Humphreys, supra note 22, at 5-3, 5-4 (discussing
some of the lease terms). This allowed a lessee to hold a lease for the entire 20 year period without production, as long as it paid the minimum royalty amount
32. See Federal Coal Leasing Policies, supra note 22, at 98, 101.
33. 40 Fed. Reg. 60,070 (Dec. 31, 1975). See also 41 Fed. Reg. 21,779 (May 28,
1976).
34. 41 Fed. Reg. 60,070 (Dec. 31, 1975). Each lease would be considered an LMU,
unless otherwise directed. Id. The forty-year period served as the basis for computing the
advance royalty payment and was not a requirement for exhausting the reserves within forty
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Initially, the Department proposed that each LMU (and thus each
lease) had to achieve diligent development, which meant development
of one-fortieth of the reserves within ten years of the later of either
the regulations or the lease issuance. 35 Upon achieving diligent development, a lessee would then have to satisfy the requirement for "continuous operation," which was defined as production of 1% or more of
the reserves each calendar year after achieving diligent development. 6
Moreover, the 'Department opted to specify that the failure to meet
diligent development or continuous operation subjected the lease to
cancellation, and in making his/her decision, the Secretary would not
consider economic market conditions or "foreseeable costs of compliance with requirements for environmental protection."" In response to
comments on its proposed rulemaking, the Department chose to compute "continuous operation" over a three-year running average, 38 and
for special cases it agreed to allow a possible five-year extension of
the diligent development requirement.3
The Carter Administration's energy policy reflected, and doubtlessly influenced, these ongoing federal agency efforts designed to pro-

years. 41 Fed. Reg. 21,780 (May 28, 1976).
35. 41 Fed. Reg. 60,070 (Dec. 31, 1975). The proposed regulations included a caveat
for extraordinary circumstances, although market factors or environmental compliance were
expressly excluded from the exception. Id. at 60,071. Cf AMCA Coal Leasing, Inc. (On
Reconsideration), 114 IBLA 246 (1990) (discussing pre-FCLAA 1982 regulations on LMU's
effective date).
36. 40 Fed. Reg. 60,071 (Dec. 31, 1975).
37. Id. Environmental compliance costs apparently were treated similar to other business costs. Id.
38. 41 Fed. Reg. 21,780-81 (May 28, 1976).
39. Id. at 21,779. The extension applied if the lessee could show that it was necessary
for the development of advanced technology, or because of the size of the mining operation,
or when a contractual arrangement existed that would result in the development of one-fortieth of the coal by the end of the extension period. Id.
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mote increased federal coal production.4" Professor Dan Tarlock aptly
described the situation as follows:
Western coal was a target for rapid exploitation. These reserves had already become attractive to utilities in the late 1960s after newly imposed
air pollution requirements created incentives to trade low energy efficiency
for environmentally superior coal of low sulfur content. Western coal was
further attractive because mining costs were lower. Thick seams near the
surface can be easily strip mined. The industry is not labor intensive, and
sixty percent of the resources are owned by the federal government and
open to easy leasing. In the 1970s, it seemed as if the federal government
was in a unique position to use its energy resources to respond quickly to
the perceived end of the petroleum era by using large amounts of federal
coal as a bridge to a new era of reliance on non-renewable resources.!4'

President Carter's National Energy Plan (NEP), formally published in
1977, envisioned greater use of coal, whether as a transition fuel or for
potential gasification,42 proposing increased coal production by twothirds, to over one billion tons per year.43 The NEP observed that
"conserving scarce oil and natural gas is far more important than saving coal."4 This emphasis on coal production was tempered by the
recognition that the Administration would, "[w]hile promoting greater
use of coal . . . seek to achieve continued improvement in environmen45
tal quality.
40. Prior to the passage of FCLAA, Congress had adopted general programs encouraging coal production. In 1970, Congress passed the Mining and Minerals Policy Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-631, 84 Stat. 1876, which act expressed Congress' policy of encouraging private mineral development, in an environmentally sensitive manner. Congress also
sought to encourage utilities to switch from natural gas or oil to coal. Energy Supply and
Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246; Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206 (1978), repealed by Pub. L. No.
100-42, 101 Stat. 310 (1987). See also Horwitch, supra note 10, at 84. This emphasis on
coal production apparently was not balanced by any effective environmental constraints, at
least not until Congress passed SMCRA and the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act.
One observer suggests that, prior to the mid-1970's at least, "[c]ontrol over electric utilities
was especially lax because the midwestem coal interests had sufficient influence in Congress
to prevent the imposition of stringent controls." ARNOLD W. REiTZE, JR., AiR POLLUTION
LAW 33-34 (1995).
41. Tarlock, supra note 10, at 351.
42. NEP, supra note 10, at XII, XIX.
43. Id. at XIII.
44. Id.
45. Id. at XIX. The NEP acknowledged the environmental issues associated with increased coal production and proposed to study the effect of increased coal utilization, including expanding research and development. Id. at 100. The Administration's environmental coal

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1996

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 98, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 4

[V/ol. 98:1023

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

1034

IV.

CONGRESS ENTERS THE FRAY: FCLAA

Before the formal release of the NEP, and only months after the
Interior Department promulgated its final diligence regulations, Congress passed FCILAA, over President Ford's veto. Through FCLAA,
Congress sought to ensure a fair return to the treasury for the leasing
of federal coal reserves, as well as to provide a mechanism for leasing
tracts of coal reserves that would be consistent with land use planning,
environmental concerns and the need for additional coal.46 Such a
planned approach to the leasing of coal reserves was accompanied by
Congress' policy choice of requiring timely development of those reserves and discouraging -

if not effectively ending -

the speculative

holding of federal coal leases. Many of the provisions of FCLAA codified, with some changes, the Department's proposed EMARS II leasing
program under the MLA.47 The new diligence requirements under
FCLAA, for instance, were patterned after the Department's recently
promulgated pre-.FCLAA rules.48 In particular, three provisions in
FCLAA were designed to end the apparent widespread speculation and
abuses identified in the federal coal program.
A.

Leasing

First, Congress ended the prospecting permit and preference right
leasing system, subject to valid existing fights. In lieu of this old program, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to divide lands
into coal leasing tracts and award leases by competitive bidding at fair
market value (a similar process had been allowed under the MLA).49
policy included several specific elements: (1) requiring the installation of best available control technologies for new plants; (2) protecting areas with clean air from significant deterioration; (3) encouraging timely state actions to address air quality concerns; (4) studying
offsetting pollution trade-offs for new installations; (5) studying the health effects of increased coal mining and use, including studying the long-term effects of C02 and other
hydrocarbons on the atmosphere; (6) supporting an uniform strip mining law; and (7) expanding the federal government's research and development program. Id. at XX. See also id.
at 63-69.
46. See generally H.R. REP. No. 681, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-12, 14-21 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1950.
47. See generally Federal Coal Leasing Policies, supra note 23, at 9-10; Solicitor's
Opinion M-36951, supra note 20.
48. See id.; Krulitz, supra note 22, at 158.
49. Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083 (1976) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994)).
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Congress further directed that "[n]o lease sale shall be held unless the
lands containing the coal deposits have been included in a comprehensive land-use plan and such sale is compatible with such plan."5' The
process for deciding what lands to lease was similar in concept to the
Department's proposed EMARS II leasing program." Leases subject

The leasing process is governed by the Part 3400 Coal Management Regulations, 43 C.F.R.
Subparts 3400-3427 (1995), which are now being reviewed in their entirety. 59 Fed. Reg.
36,108, 36,110 (1994). For regulations governing those preference right lease applications
based upon prospecting permits issued prior to FCLAA, see 43 C.F.R. Subparts 3430-32,
3445-46 (1995). See also supra note 25. Generally, leasing can occur either upon application
or in accordance with the leasing procedures for coal production regions. E.g., 43 C.F.R.
Subpart 3425 (1995) (leasing by application). Under the regional leasing program, the Secretary establishes regional leasing levels, based, in part, upon any environmental, social and
economic effects, any industry expressed interest, the projected future demand for coal and a
consideration of any national energy needs. 43 C.F.R. § 3420.2 (1995). Once regional levels
are set, tracts are then identified for leasing through the activity planning process, which
results in the preparation of a regional lease sale EIS that identifies the lease tract ranking
and selections. 43 C.F.R. § 3420.3 (1995). Coal lands identified in the land use planning
process are reviewed by regional coal teams, during this activity planning process. 43 C.F.R.
§§ 3420.1-8, 3420.2, 3420.3-1 (1995). For recent regional coal team activities in two wellknown areas, see, e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 24,647 (1995) (Unita-Southwestern Utah area); 60 Fed.
Reg. 62107 (1995) (Powder River area in Wyoming). After consultation with the various
affected interests (43 C.F.R. § 3420.4 (1995)), the Secretary may then offer the selected
tracts for lease sale through a competitive bidding process. 43 C.F.R. § 3420.5, & Part 3422
(1995). Competitive bidding is not required in circumstances warranting emergency leasing.
43 C.F.R. § 3425.1-4 (1995). See David B. Pariser, Current Issues Relating to Emergency
FederalCoal Leasing, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 593 (1987). The Act also authorizes the issuance
of an exploration license that confers no lease rights under the Act. 90 Stat. 1085; see also
43 C.F.R. Subpart 3410 (1995).
50. Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1084 (1976) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)(A)(i)
(1994)). See 43 C.F.R. § 3420.1-4 (1994). Only a few months after Congress enacted
FCLAA, it passed the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 [hereinafter
,FLPMA], Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2744 (1976), which included a requirement for the
development of new land use plans. 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (1988). FCLAA land use plans were
to include an assessment of the amount of coal deposits, identifying those deposits recoverable from surface or underground mining. Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1085 (1976) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)(B) (1994)). Congress further envisioned an exploratory program that would provide an assessment of the amount of lands containing recoverable coal
reserves available for leasing. Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1088 (1976) (codified at 30
U.S.C. § 208-1 (1994)). FCLAA also directed the Secretary to consider environmental impacts prior to leasing. Id. at 1085 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)(C) (1994)). FCLAA,
however, does contain an exception to this general requirement. 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)(A)(ii)
(1994). For a comparison with land use planning in the context of oil and gas leasing, see
generally NAIONAL RESEARCH CoUNCIL, LAND USE PLANNING AND OIL AND GAS LEASING
ON ONSHORE FEDERAL LANDS

(1989).

51. "Congress adopted many of the elements of the EMARS II program in the"
FCLAA. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Mineral Law in the United States: A Study in Legal
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to FCLAA would require the payment of annual rentals, as well as a
royalty rate of not less than 12 1/2% for surface mining operations and
possibly a lesser amount for underground mining operations. 2 The
royalty rate for underground mines was not congressionally established,
but has since been set by the Interior Department at 8%, unless after
lease issuance the Secretary determines that conditions warrant a reduction.53 In lieu of the old indefinite twenty-year leases under the MLA,
FCLAA further required lease readjustment every ten years.54
B. Requirements to Avoid Speculative Lease Holdings
Second, Congress strengthened the diligent development requirements that already existed in Section 7 of the original MLA. Section 3
of FCLAA banned the issuance of any new leases under the MLA,
including oil and gas leases, to a lessee holding a non-producing federal coal lease for over ten years after the effective date of FCLAA.5
Change, reprintedin NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY AND LAW: TRENDS AND DIRECTIONS 6693, 85 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates eds. (1993)). See also Martin, supra
note 19, at 1038-45; Tarlock, supra note 19, at 336.
52. Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat 1087 (1976) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1994)).
The federal royalty may be reduced, when it is done for the purpose of encouraging the
greatest ultimate recovery of federal coal, and in the interest of conservation of federal coal
and other resources, upon the determination that such reduction is necessary to promote
development or where the lease can not be successfully operated under its terms. 43 C.F.R.
§ 3485.2(c)(1) (1995). Cf. Solicitor's Opinion M-36920, Reduction of Production Royalties
Below Statutory Minimum Rates, 87 I.D. 69 (1979). See also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
NEED FOR GUIDANCE AND CONTROLS ON ROYALTY RATE REDUCTIONS FOR FEDERAL COAL

LEASES (GAO/EMD-32-86 1982); David B. Pariser, Federal Coal Royalty Reduction and
Product Valuation, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 805 (1988). For a general discussion on leasing in
the preamble to the 1982 regulations, see 47 Fed. Reg. 33,115-33,128 (1982).
53. 43 C.F.R. § 3473.3-2(a)(2) (1995); 44 Fed. Reg. 33,132 (1982).
54. 30 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1995); 43 C.F.R. § 3451.1 (1995).
55. Section 3 of FCLAA amended Section 2(a) of the MLA to proscribe, in part, the
issuance of a lease "where any such entity holds a lease or leases issued by the United
States to coal deposits and has held such lease or leases for a period of ten years when
such entity is not, except as provided for in Section 7(b) of this Act, producing coal from
the lease deposits in commercial quantities." Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat 1083, 1083-84
(codified at 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(2)(A) (1994)). See H.R. REP. No. 681, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 15 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1951 (lessees would be prohibited from
acquiring new federal leases if they held non-producing federal coal lease for 15 - later
changed to 10 - years after enactment). See also 122 Cong. Rec. 135 (1976) (remarks of
Cong. Patsy Mink). Initially, it was unclear whether the Section 3 ban on the issuance of
new leases applied to non-coal leases as well. See 47 Fed. Reg. 33,131 (1982) (1982 final
rulemaking for Section 3 only relates to coal leases and "implies nothing about section 3's
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Industry opposed this provision and unsuccessfully tried to have it
repealed in the early 1980S.16 The ten year requirement, however, simply prompted lessees fearful of the consequences to sell - or apparently relinquish - their leases,57 a possibility made all the more attractive when Congress in 1985 gave lessees an additional four months
to take such action.58 Of course, today this provision is effectively
superfelous, because the ten year diligent development requirement in
FCLAA, discussed below, should prevent a lessee from ever triggering
the Section 3 ban. 9

applicability to other minerals"). The Interior Department Solicitor settled this issue in 1985,
by holding that it did. Solicitor's Opinion M-36951, supra note 20, at 539. This view prevailed in Conoco, Inc. v. Hodel, 626 F. Supp. 287 (D. Del. 1986). The Solicitor also concluded that the Department acted legally in interpreting the Section 3 language "producing . . .in commercial quantities." Solicitor's Opinion M-36951, supra note 20. See also 51
Fed. Reg. 37,202, 37,203 (1986) (proposed rule under Section 2(a)(2)(A) and discussing
BLM's guidelines); 51 Fed. Reg. 43,910 (1986) (final rule).
56. See Bagge, supra note 25, at 721. The Department of the Interior supported a
repeal. See Da'T INTERIOR, FED. COAL MGMT. REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1984 at 46 (explaining Interior's position). Indeed, the Department originally had not endorsed this provision.

H.R. REP. No. 681, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1975).
57. A 1981 report prepared by the Office of Technology and Assessment (OTA) suggested that the majority of the existing pre-FCLAA leases would not likely meet the Section
3 ten year production requirement. OTA REPORT, An Assessment of Development and Production Potential of Federal Coal Leases, at 21, 238 (1981). In 1986, OTA's analysis of
Section 3 stated that approximately half of the then existing western pre-FCLAA leases were
unlikely to satisfy the Section 3 deadline. OTA SPECIAL REPORT, Potential Effects of Section
3 of the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, at 3 (1986). The result as the
GAO has observed, is that "a lessee wishing to qualify for new leases may sell or relinquish the leases that are causing disqualification." GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MINERAL
RESOURCES: FEDERAL COAL-LEASING PROGRAM NEEDS STRENGTHENING 27 (GAO/RCED-9410 Sept. 1994) [hereinafter MINERAL RESOURCES]. When a disqualification appeared on the
horizon, perhaps the only hinderance to such a transfer was whether the Department would
authorize the assignment and how the Department would treat apparent assignees not controlled by or affiliated with the assignor. See 47 Fed. Reg. 33,131 (1982). BLM's oversight
of assignments appears limited, except in instances where an overriding royalty may adversely affect production. See 43 C.F.R. § 3473.3-2(d) (1995); Gifford H. Allen et al., 131 IBLA
195 (1994); Robert H. Gleason, 129 IBLA 378 (1994). But BLM could not approve an assignment when the assignee was not qualified because of Section 2(a)(2)(A), even where the
assignment was filed - and just not approved - prior to December 31, 1986. Veola and
Aaron Rasmussen, 109 IBLA 106 (1989). See generally Solicitor's Opinion M-36951, supra
note 22, at 555-57, 563 n.84, n. 91 (discussing assignments).
58. Although August 4, 1976 was the effective date of FCLAA, Congress in 1985
extended the deadline from August 4, 1986 to December 31, 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-190,
§ 101(d) (1985).
59. See Solicitor's Opinion M-36951, supra note 20, at 549.
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Before a lessee whose lease is subject to FCLAA can begin operations and production, it must comply with the requirements of both
SMCRA and FCLAA.60 FCLAA compliance includes those requirements designed to ensure against speculative holdings and provide
for the maximum economic recovery (MER) of federal coal. In order
to ensure MER, Section 3 of FCLAA also provides that "no mining
operating plan shall be approved which is not found to achieve the
maximum economic recovery of coal within the tract."'" The implementing regulations follow this command by specifically requiring that
12
lessees develop their leases in a manner that will achieve MER
Mining operations must comply with these requirements63 as well as
an approved resource recovery and protection plan and any other appropriate agency orders. 4 Also, operators are to prevent the wasting
60. Cf Atlantic Richfield Co., West Elk Coal Co., 112 IBLA 115 (1989) (distinguishing between compliance with SMCRA and compliance with FCLAA). Wholly independent of FCLAA, for example, SMCRA might require applicants for a SMCRA permit to
provide a description of the anticipated annual and total production of coal over the life of
the mine within the proposed permit area. 30 C.F.R. § 784.11 (1994). The applicant also
might have to describe in its application the estimated life of the operations, as well as the
size, sequence and timing of anticipated subareas for which individual permits for mining
will be sought 30 C.F.R. §§ 783.12(a), 783.24(c), 784.23(a) (1994). As one commentator
notes, SMCRA requires the preparation of both an operational and reclamation plan, with
"[d]elays in procuring permit approval are the mine planner's nightmare. . . . Adequate
preparation can mean several years of baseline studies and data compilation to evaluate hydrology, air quality, fish and wildlife, vegetation, soils, geology, archaeological resources and
land use." Harold P. Quinn, Jr., Coal Resource Development and Land Use Planning: The
Demands of SMCRA, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 24, 27 (1989).
61. Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat 1085 (1976) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)(C)
(1994)). See also H.R. REP. No. 681, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1975), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1956.
62. 43 C.F.R. § 3482.2(a)(2) (1995). The regulation defines MER, as requiring that:
based on standard industry operating practices, all profitable portions of a leased
Federal coal deposit must be mined. At the times of MER determinations, consideration will be given to: existing proven technology; commercially available and
economically feasible equipment; coal quality, quantity, and marketability; safety,
exploration, operating, processing, and transportation costs; and compliance with
applicable laws and regulations. The requirement of MER does not restrict the
authority of the authorized officer to ensure the conservation of the recoverable
coal reserves and other resources and to prevent the wasting of coal.
43 C.F.R. § 3480.0-5(a)(21) (1995). See also 47 Fed. Reg. 33,167-68 (1982) (discussing
MER). The MER determination may be adjusted as additional information is gathered during
development Id. at 33,166. For a discussion of MER prior to the 1982 regulations, see
Tarlock, supra note 10, at 353-54.
63. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 3483.1, 3484.1 (1995).
64. 43 C.F.R. § 3481.1(b) (1995).
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of coal and other resources and "shall adequately protect the recoverable coal reserves and other resources upon abandonment."6 An approved plan, moreover, is a pre-condition to commencing any operations or development.
FCLAA creates an absolute three year deadline for submitting a
resource recovery and protection plan (often called a 3-year
"R2P2"). 66 This mandate prompts federal lessees to prepare plans for
developing the coal resources shortly after lease issuance or readjustment.67 An R2P2 must satisfy FCLAA's requirements, including a
description of the proposed mining operation, an estimate of the coal
reserve base, minable reserve base, and recoverable reserves for each
federal lease included in the R2P2, LMU boundaries, if applicable, as
well as a general layout of the proposed mine and the planned sequence of mining for the life of the mine. 68 This plan also must explain how the lessee expects to satisfy the diligence requirements and

65. 43 C.F.R. § 3481.1(c) (1995). See also 43 C.F.R. §§ 3484.1(b), (c), 3484.2
(1995).
66. 30 U.S.C. § 207(c) (1994). The R2P2 is defined as "a plan showing that the
proposed operation meets the requirements of the MLA for development, production, resource recovery and protection, diligent development, continued operation, MER, and the
rules of this part for the life-of-the mine." 43 C.F.R. § 3480.0-5(34) (1995). In its regulations, the Interior Department had authorized the granting of an extension of this 3-year
filing requirement 43 C.F.R. § 3483.3(a) (1995). In NRDC v. Jamison, 815 F. Supp. 454,
470-71 (D.D.C. 1992), however, the court held that FCLAA did not authorize granting such
extensions. In response, the Department has proposed removing this provision. 59 Fed. Reg.
66874 (1994).
67. The regulations contemplate that lessees may satisfy this 3-yen R2P2 submittal
requirement and then have an additional period for compliance with other requirements, such
as those under SMCRA. 47 Fed. Reg. 33,157, 33,165-66 (1982). The 3-year R2P2, therefore, need not be a detailed mine plan, but instead need only address the FCLAA requirements. See 47 Fed. Reg. 33,161 (July 30, 1982). According to the regulations, this 3-year
R2P2 can be submitted to the authorized officer solely to satisfy the FCLAA filing requirement. 43 C.F.R § 3482.1(b) (1995). Yet, before mining can occur, there must be an R2P2
submitted either with or after the submission of a permit application package (PAP) to the
regulatory authority in accordance with SMCRA. Id.; 43 C.F.R. § 3482.2(a)(2) (1995). When
the PAP is submitted to the SMCRA regulatory authority, "any deviations from the original
[R2P2] that are reflected in the [PAP] must be submitted to [BLM] in order to ensure that
the [R2P2] and the [PAP] address the same proposed operation at the time of approval of
commencement of mining operations." 47 Fed. Reg. 33,165 (1982); see also 47 Fed. Reg. at
33,167. The regulations provide that this R2P2 is submitted to the Assistant Secretary for
decision. 43 C.F.R. § 3480.0-6(d)(2) (1995).
68. See 43 C.F.R § 3482.1 (1995).
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achieve MER for the leases included in the R2P2. 69 A plan can be
approved only if it conforms with
the regulations and is found to
70
coal.
federal
the
of
achieve MER
As we have seen, FCLAA also adopted the Interior Department's
concept of requiring diligent development." Section 6 of FCLAA
amended Section 7 of the MLA by expressly directing that lessees who
have leases not producing coal in commercial quantities at the end of
ten years are to have those leases terminated.72 The regulations define
"diligent development" to mean "the production of recoverable coal
reserves in commercial quantities prior to the end of the diligent devel7
opment period. ' ,73 And, after meandering through further definitions, 1
69. 43 C.F.R. § 3482.1 (1995).
70. 43 C.F.R. § 3482.1(a)(2) (1995). The regulations allow a lessee or operator to propose modifications to a R2P2. 43 C.F.R. § 3482.2(c) (1995). See also 47 Fed. Reg. 33,16970 (1982) (discussing changes to an approved R2P2).
71. See 43 C.F.R. § 3483.1 (1995).
72. Congress originally considered requiring lessees to achieve diligent development
within 15 years, H.R. REP. No. 681, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 21 (1975), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1951, 1957, but the period was later changed to 10 years. 122 CONG. REC.
148-49, 504 (1976). See generally Solicitor's Opinion M-36951, supra note 20, at 547-49.
Congress also proposed in the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, to transfer
the authority for developing diligence rules to the Department of Energy. See 46 Fed. Reg.
62,226 (1981) (Department of Energy proposed diligence regulations); 91 Stat. 579. On December 23, 1981, this authority reverted back to Interior pursuant to Pub. L. No. 97-100.
Within Interior, the I3LM obtained jurisdiction over the program pursuant to Order No.
3087, issued by the Secretary of the Interior on December 3, 1982. 48 Fed. Reg. 41,589
(1983); 47 Fed. Reg. 33,154, 819 (1982).
73. 43 C.F.R. § 3480.0-5(a)(12) (1995). See 47 Fed. Reg. 33,157 (1982) (discussing
diligent development).
74. "Recoverable coal reserves" is defined as the "minable reserve base," after certain
exclusions (e.g., property barriers, pillars, fenders). 43 C.F.R. § 3480.0-5(a)(32) (1995). The
amount of "recoverable coal reserves" is estimated by the authorized officer as of the date
of approval of a R2P2 or the date of approval of a mine plan under the SMCRA regulations. 43 C.F.R. § 3482.2(a)(3) (1995). This estimate may be changed only if new information becomes available. Id.; see also Ark Land Co., 132 IBLA 235, 241 (1995) (determination of recoverable coal reserves is a dynamic process). "Minable reserve base," in turn,
includes that portion of the "coal reserve base" that is commercially minable, including coal
left in the ground for pillars, fenders, property barriers, or the like, but excluding areas
where mining is prohibited, such as areas classified as unsuitable for coal mining. 43 C.F.R.
§ 3480.0-5(a)(23) (1995). The definition of "coal reserve base" is somewhat more elaborate,
with a means for estimating the amount of tons in place in each coal bed. 43 C.F.R.
§ 3480.0-5(a)(5) (1995). The genesis of this definition is General Mining Order No. 1, issued in 1979. See Atlantic Richfield Co., West Elk Coal Co., 112 IBLA 115, 118 n.5
(1989). See generally 47 Fed. Reg. 33156 (1982) (discussing coal reserve base, minable
reserve base and recoverable coal reserves).
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this means that lessees must develop 1% of the commercially minable
coal in a lease or a LMU, less pillars, fenders, property barriers and
the like, within ten years of lease issuance, readjustment or the effective date of an LMU.75 Failure to satisfy diligent development results
in lease or LMU termination. 6 Once lessees achieve diligent development, they must still comply with the requirement for "continued operation"" or, when permitted, pay an "advance royalty."78 In order to
address a prior loophole, Congress limited the number of years a lessee
can pay advance royalty.79
C. Logical Mining Units
Finally, FCLAA confirmed the Department's pre-existing acceptance of the concept of an LMU, with certain changes."0 Section 5 of

75. 43 C.F.R. § 3480.0-5(a)(13) (1995) (defining "diligent development period"); id. at
§ 3480.0-5(a)(6) (defining "Commercial quantities"). See also 43 C.F.R. § 3483.5 (1995)
(crediting of production toward diligent development).
76. 43 C.F.R_ § 3483.2(a) (1995). The diligence period, however, can be suspended
under Section 39 of the MLA. See infra notes 98-128 and accompanying text.
77. 43 C.F.R. § 3480.0-5(a)(8) (1995). "Continued operation" is the production of at
least "commercial quantities" of recoverable coal reserves in the first two "continued operation" years after achieving diligent development and then such production over a three year
running average thereafter. Id. "Continued operation year" is defined as "the 12-month period beginning with the commencement of the first royalty reporting period following the date
that diligent development is achieved and each 12-month period thereafter", unless suspended. 43 C.F.R. § 3480.0-5(a)(9) (1995). E.g., Coastal States Energy Co., 110 IBLA 179
(1989) (applying continued operation requirement).
78. 30 U.S.C. § 207(b) (1994); 43 C.F.R. § 3480.0-5(a)(1) (1995) (defining "advance
royalty"); 43 C.F.R. § 3483.4 (1995) (terms for payment of advance royalty). See, e.g.,
Western Slope Carbon, Inc., 98 IBLA 198 (1987). Cf. 43 C.F.R. § 3483.2(c) (1995) ("[a]ny
Federal coal lease on which continued operation is not maintained shall be subject to cancellation"). The BLM has indicated that "until an operation has produced 1 percent of the
recoverable coal reserves, advance royalty cannot be accepted." 47 Fed. Reg. 33156 (1982).
See Cyprus Western Co. (on judicial remand), 133 IBLA 52 (1995) (advance royalty due
only after lessee achieves diligent development). Unlike rental payments or other royalties,
the regulations do not provide for the waiver, suspension or reduction of advance royalty
payments. 43 C.F.R. § 3485.2(c)(1) (1995). The requirement for continued operation or the
payment of advance royalties might be suspended during the period of a force majeure
event. 30 U.S.C. § 207(b) (1994); 43 C.F.R. § 3483.3 (1995); Solicitor's Opinion M-36951,
supra note 21, at 551. See generally Ark Land Co., 132 IBLA 235 (1995).
79. See Solicitor's Opinion M-36951, supra note 20, at 551-52. See generally supra
note 20 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text. See also Federal Coal Leasing

Policies, supra note 22, at 113 (Senator Lee Metcalf's floor statement regarding LMU's).
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FCLAA authorized the Secretary to approve the consolidation of federal and adjacent non-federal coal leases into an LMU, upon a determination that such consolidation would serve the maximum economic
recovery of a single or multiple coal deposit." The BLM recently
explained the benefits of an LMU:
A logical mining unit may consist of one or more Federal leaseholds,
and may include intervening or adjacent lands in which the United States
does not own the coal resources, but all the lands in a logical mining unit

must be under the effective control of a single operator, be able to be
developed and operated as a single operation and be contiguous.
An LMU is a production allocation mechanism, which allows a
straightforward approach to the logical sequencing of mining operations on

contiguous lands. The purpose of an LMU is to permit coal to be mined
in a sequence that makes sense. In the western United States, where
checkerboard land-ownership patterns are common, an operator may de-

velop several contiguous coal leases on lands that are owned by different
entities that were leased at different times. In some cases, requiring the

operator to mine the oldest Federal leases first in order to meet diligent
development requirements would be inefficient and would not ensure maximum economic recovery of coal reserves. Similarly, requiring an operator
to maintain production on multiple contiguous leases in order to meet
lessee-qualification requirements under Section 2(a)(2)(A) or continued

operation requirements under Section 7 of MLA would be inefficient.
An LMU consolidates two or more Federal leases (or Federal and
non-Federal tracts) and allows the Secretary to credit production from
anywhere in the LMU to all Federal leases contained in the LMU, for
purposes of diligent development, continued operation and lessee qualification. Thus, formation of an LMU can permit more efficient mine sequencing, allowing an operator to progress logically from one lease to the
next, while also allowing the lessee to meet applicable production
requirements. 8'

The procedure for obtaining the designation of an LMU is established
in the BLM regulations, which provide that the BLM may direct the
formation of an LMU or may approve an operator/lessee's request for
an LMU.83 An LMU cannot exceed 25,000 acres,84 and it must be

81. Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1086 (1976) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 202a(l)
(1994)).
82. 59 Fed. Reg. 66874 (1994).
83. 43 C.F.R. § 3487.1 (1995). An LMU can be approved if all the federal leases
within the LMU are made subject to the FCLAA requirements, such as the submittal of an
R2P2, diligent development, continued operation, MER and payment of advance royalty. Id.;
30 U.S.C. § 202a(2), (3) (1994). Pre-FCLAA leases within an LMU are made subject to
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"mined within a period established by the Secretary which shall not be
more than forty years."85 BLM had approved 39 LMU's as of December 1994, which when totaled comprise 155 of the remaining 431 leases (as of Fiscal Year '93), 32% of the federal lease acres and 51% of
federal coal production.86
The formation of an LMU can serve as one way of mitigating or
possibly avoiding the diligence requirements. When Congress enacted
FCLAA, it understood that LMUs might be used to circumvent the
diligence requirements. Chairwoman Patsy Mink, of the House Subcommittee on Mining, observed that LMUs can provide an "enormous
exemption to the requirements of due diligence and continuous operation by permitting old leases to be consolidated and treated as
one .... "87 According to a recent report by the General Accounting
Office (GAO), Chairwoman Mink's comments might be prophetic.
In September of 1994, the GAO issued a report, "Mineral Resources: Federal Coal-Leasing Program Needs Strengthening,3 88 addressing, in part, the Bureau of Land Management's efforts to "encour-

Section 2(d) of FCLAA. 30 U.S.C. § 202a(5) (1994). For new proposed LMU rules, see
infra note 95 and accompanying text.
84. 30 U.S.C. § 202a(7) (1994). This acreage limitation apparently reflected an extrapolation of the amount of coal necessary to satisfy a large power plant's production needs
over a forty year period. See Federal Coal Leasing Policies, supra note 22, at 113 (statement of Senator Lee Metcalf).
85. 30 U.S.C. § 202a(2) (1994). The 40 year mine-out period paralleled the
Department's prior effort at simply encouraging a 40 year development scenario. Senator Lee
Metcalf, the chairman of the subcommittee overseeing mineral activities, expressed concern
that the Interior Department's draft diligence regulations might allow a lease within an LMU
to be held for over a hundred years, merely by satisfying the "continued operation" amount
Federal Coal Leasing Policies, supra note 22, at 104-05. Alihough Congress expressly addressed this issue, the Department could have ensured a 40 year mine-out period by requiring compliance with a mine plan that included development in excess of the "continued
operation" amount with the only apparent difference being the Department's flexibility for
responding to a violation of a mine plan versus a failure to satisfy "continued operation."
See 41 Fed. Reg. 56,644 (Dec. 29, 1976).
86. 59 Fed. Reg. 66,875 (1994).
87. 122 Cong. Rec. 507 (1976) (remarks of Cong. Patsy Mink). Often, a critical issue
in the establishment of an LMU is its effective date - that is, the date that starts the diligence clock. See, e.g., AMCA Coal Leasing, Inc., 114 IBLA 246 (1990) (on reconsideration). See generally MRNERAL RESOURCES, supra note 57, at 67-68 (letter from Associate
Solicitor, Division of Energy and Resources, Department of the Interior, discussing, in part,
an LMU's effective date).
88. MINERAL RESOURCES, supra note 57.
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age the development of federal coal leases" and "consider projected
demand in coal-leasing decisions."89 Initially, the report focused on
whether the BLM disregarded Section 3 of FCLAA when it issued new
MLA leases to Kerr-McGee Coal Corporation (Kerr-McGee), concluding that "BLM issued federal mineral leases to a lessee who does not
meet FCLAA's qualification requirements."90
After March 1988, the BLM issued several oil and gas leases and
one coal lease to Kerr-McGee, even though Kerr-McGee had "held two
pre-FCLAA coal leases in an LMU from which no coal had been produced since February 1988 .. . .""The GAO opined that the company was not qualified to acquire any new leases, "because it has not
produced coal in commercial quantities from the LMU since the LMU
was formed and has not produced any coal at all from the LMU since
1988."92 Similarly, the GAO questioned the BLM's approval of a
lease sale and formation of an LMU to Northwestern, where both the
sale and LMU allowed Northwestern to avoid what GAO believed as

89. Letter from Keith 0. Fultz, Assistant Comptroller General to Hon. Richard
Lehman, Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources, Committee on Natural
Resources, House of Representatives, Sept. 16, 1994, reprinted in MINERAL RESOURCES,
supra note 57. The GAO specifically examined "actions taken by (1) BLM to encourage the
development of federal coal leases, (2) BLM and the Forest Service to address cumulative
environmental impacts of additional coal leasing, and (3) BLM to consider projected demand
in coal-leasing decisions." Id. at 20.
Issues two and three appear to have been prompted by the Department's focus on
leasipg-by-application rather than by having certain areas identified for leasing through the
regional coal sales process. The regional process necessarily would include an assessment of
demand, as well as a regional environmental document that by its nature would address
cumulative environmental impacts. "On March 17, 1994, in response to a draft of this report, BLM issued an instruction memorandum to its field offices directing that each environmental document either directly address cumulative impacts or incorporate, by reference,
other environmental documents that address cumulative impacts." Id.
90. MINERAL RESOURCES, supra note 57, at 4.
91. Id. at 23. According to the GAO, these two coal leases had not produced any coal
as of September 26, 1986, a few months prior to the December 30, 1986 date; however,
they were placed in an LMU with a producing state lease, such that production from the
associated state lease would be attributable to the two federal leases. Mining operations in
the LMU were then suspended the following year. Id. at 24.
92. Id. at 25. As of 1988, the company had not produced coal from the LMU in
commercial quantities, although the terms of its "stipulations of approval" only required
production in commercial quantities from the effective date of the LMU - or September
26, 1986.
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imminent termination of a non-producing federal coal lease containing
an estimated 55 million tons of recoverable coal.93
The Department responded by explaining why the BLM's activities
were authorized under FCLAA, although noting that perhaps, as a
policy matter, the GAO's concerns were legitimate and that the Department was undertaking a review of its LMU regulations.94 On December 28, 1994, the Department of the Interior proposed new LMU rules,
with the purpose, in part, of amending "the regulations . . . to ensure
that, consistent with the goals of [FCLAA] and the [MLA], LMU's are
approved only for the purpose of developing federal coal resources in
an 'efficient, economical and orderly manner,' and not solely for the
purpose of extending diligent development periods."95
D. Section 39 Suspensions of Operations/Production
Another way of potentially avoiding the harsh effects of the diligence requirement is for a lessee to obtain a suspension of the lease
and regulatory requirements. A suspension can be granted either under
Section 7(b) or Section 39 of the MLA. Section 7(b) of the MLA
alleviates compliance with the continued operation requirement, in
limited circumstances, "where operations under the lease are interrupted
by strikes, the elements or casualties not attributable to the lessees."9 "

93. Id. at 28.
94. MNERAL RESOURCES, supra note 57, at 61-71, 76-88, 92-107. The Department's
Solicitor had previously recognized this possible problem with an LMU designation.
Solicitor's Opinion M-36951, supra note 20, at 554-55. The BLM has noted that "in some
circumstances, the existing regulations could be used as a device to circumvent FCLAAmandated lease-specific production requirements." 59 Fed. Reg. 66,874, 66,875 (1994) (to be
codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3400, 3470, and 3480) (proposed Dec. 28, 1994).
95. 59 Fed. Reg. 66,874. The proposed rule also would clarify the definition of "producing." Id. The current regulation defines "producing" to include "operating an ongoing
mining operation in accordance with standard industry operation practices." 43 C.F.R.
§ 3400.0-5(rr)(6) (1995). The NOPR expresses concern that this definition might not serve
FCLAA's policy goal of preventing speculative lease holdings. 59 Fed. Reg. 66,874, 66,876.
"Finally, the proposed rule would remove the provision that allows extension of the 3-year
deadline for submission of resource recovery and protection plans." Id. at 66,874.
96. 30 U.S.C. § 207(b) (1994). The IBLA has noted that the language of the force
majeure exception only applies to "continued operation" and not to the requirement for "diligent development." See Mountain States Resources Corp., 111 IBLA 160, 163 n.5 (1989);
see also Mountain States Resources Corp., 92 IBLA 184, 192 (1986); Solicitor's Opinion M36958, Suspensions of Operations & Production for Coal Leases Under Section 39 of the
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By contrast, Section 39 authorizes the granting of a suspension in
many more instances. The Secretary may "assent" or "direct" a "suspension of operations and production under any lease granted under the
terms of' the MLA, when it would be in the "interest of conserva97
tion.
The Secretary's authority to issue suspensions is dependent upon a
determination that the action would be in the "interest of conservation."
This phrase has been interpreted broadly "to include not only maximizing recovery and avoiding or minimizing waste or loss of the leased
mineral resource but also avoiding or minimizing damage to other
natural resources, such as wildlife, water quality, air quality, and other
minerals.""8 The preamble to the final regulations, therefore, suggests
that a suspension might be appropriate for the duration of the preparation of the environmental impact statement.99 Additionally, the IBLA
has suggested that a suspension of the lease term might be appropriate
due to administrative actions addressing environmental concerns.0 0

Mineral Leasing Act, 96 I.D. 15, 25 (1988) ("Congress felt compelled to state that none of
the relief measures in section 7(b) . . . may be construed to delay commencement of production beyond the 10-year period . .
").
97. 30 U.S.C. § 209 (1994). Section 39 also authorizes the Secretary to "waive, suspend, or reduce the rental, or minimum royalty, or reduce the royalty on an entire [or portion of a] leasehold" when it is "necessary to do so in order to promote development, or
whenever in his judgment the leases cannot be successfully operated under the terms provided therein," and the Secretary's action is for the "purpose of encouraging the greatest ultimate .recovery" and is in the "interest of conservation." Id.; see also supra note 52.
98. Solicitor's Opinion M-36958, supra note 96, at 18. See Copper Valley Mach.
Works, Inc. v. Andns, 653 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (protecting tundra/permafrost environment); Getty Oil Co. v. Clark, 614 F. Supp. 904 (D. Wyo. 1985), afd 840 F.2d 776
(10th Cir. 1988) (allowing Secretary to tailor suspension to environmental values of the
leased premises).
99. 53 Fed. Reg. 49,984, 49,985 (1988) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3480).
100. Alfred G. Hoyl 123 IBLA 169, 191 (1992) (Hoyl I), modified and a]j'd, 123
IBLA 194A (1993) (Hoyl II), and later proceeding, 127 IBLA 297 (1993); Nevdak Oil &
Exploration, Inc., 104 IBLA 133, 138 (1988) ("operations and production may be suspended . . . where suspension affords the Department sufficient time to decide whether and/or
under what circumstances to permit exploration and development of the mineral resource so
as to best protect other resources."); see also Clark, 614 F. Supp. at 920; John March, 98
IBLA 143, 147 (1987); Jones-O'Brien, 85 I.D. 89 (1978). In Northern Cheyenne Tribe v.
Hodel, the court initially voided certain lease sales for failure to comply with the National
Environmental Policy Act [hereinafter NEPA], and the Federal government and the lessees
requested that the court amend its relief to suspend rather than rescind the leases, pending
the outcome of NEPA compliance. CV 82-116-BLG-JFB (D. Mont. 1986), rev'd and remanded, 842 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1988), motion granted sub nom. Tribe v. Lujan, 804 F.
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It also would appear that a Section 39 suspension may be granted,
in the interest of conservation, where the lessee has not yet commenced operations or production. In the preamble to the final regulations, the BLM responded to a comment by noting that "the timing of
the suspension of operations has no bearing on the manner in which a
Federal coal lease is suspended."' '° The preamble further explained
that suspensions generally will not be granted unless operations have
commenced and production has occurred; but this general rule may not
apply when a suspension is appropriate to avoid or minimize damage
to other natural resources.102 The preamble invokes Getty Oil Co. v.
Clark, and implicitly refers to the circumstances in Consolidation Coal
Co.," °3 then pending before the Department."0 4
In Getty Oil Co., the Department granted a suspension prior to
commencement of oil and gas operations. There, the lessee sought a
suspension shortly before it was faced with a termination of its lease
for failure to drill. In Consolidation Coal Co., a federal coal lessee had
not begun operations on its coal lease, and it sought to develop its
lease together with an adjacent parcel of land on which the lessee had
a preference right lease application (PLRA). Originally, the BLM had
prepared an environmental assessment (EA) on the PRLA. That EA
apparently took approximately two years to prepare and it did not
contemplate joint development of the two contiguous leases. In lieu of
following the ROD accompanying the EA, the lessee then amended its
proposed mine plan to include both leases. The BLM determined that
the decision on the PRLA required the preparation of an EIS, due to
the significant increase in proposed coal production. The BLM granted
a suspension effective on the date of the EIS announcement.10 5

Supp. 1281 (D. Mont. 1991). The court agreed and directed the Secretary to act under Section 39. Any discussion about Section 39 suspensions typically presumes the applicability of
suspension decisions for oil and gas lease leases, although the diligence requirements and
concern for speculative holdings is not necessarily the same for oil/gas leases as it is for
coal leases. Id.
101. 53 Fed. Reg. 49,984 (1988).
102. Hoyl I, 123 IBLA at 191 n.18 (referring to preamble). But see Hoyl I, 123 IBLA

at 194C n.2.
103. 111 IBLA 381 (1989).
104. See 53 Fed. Reg. 49,985.
105. It is not clear whether the BLM ever made a finding that the suspension was in
the "interest of conservation." Instead, the BLM noted that, unless Consol obtained a PRL to
the adjacent tract, Consol could not submit and obtain approval of a comprehensive mining
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The IBLA has observed that the granting of a suspension might
become a "matter of right where, through some act, omission, or delay
by a Federal agency, beneficial enjoyment of a lease has been precluded . . .. ""' For example, the IBLA has indicated that when the
Government, on its own initiative and without any pending suspension
application, affirmatively orders a restriction on operations and/or production, the lessee is entitled to an automatic extension of the lease
terms and conditions during the period of any such suspension. 7 In
0 8 for example, the
Copper Valley Machine Works, Inc. v. Andrus,"
court held that the Secretary directed a de facto suspension when it
issued a drilling permit prohibiting drilling during the summer months.
In Getty Oil Co., the question of the discretionary nature of a
suspension arose in the context of a dispute over the scope of an EIS
in the oil and gas program. There, the legal issue was whether the EIS
on the company's application for a permit to drill (APD) required a
"no action" alternative. The IBLA held that a "no action" alternative
precluding drilling should have been considered, because the possibility
of precluding developmeit was preserved under the terms of a suspension granted to the company." 9 Getty Oil argued that the suspension

plan under SMCRA. But this apparent omission is irrelevant, since the IBLA's decision did
not involve a review of the suspension. Rather, shortly after BLM granted the suspension,
BLM also issued a decision readjusting Consol's pre-FCLAA lease, with an effective date
that was earlier than the initial 20 year lease period plus the suspension period. Consol
objected to BLM's attempt to readjust the lease term, arguing that it was entitled to the
initial 20 year lease period. The IBLA agreed. It held that the 20 year period prior to readjustment is tolled during the Section 39 suspension. 111 IBLA at 390.
106. Nevdak Oil & Exploration, Inc., 104 IBLA at 137 (1988). In Alfred G. Hoyl, the
IBLA opined that the Getty court suggested that a suspension is required "where delays
imposed upon the lessee due to administrative actions addressing environmental concerns
have the effect of denying the lessee's operator 'timely access' to the property, as it would
be an abuse of discretion not to grant a suspension in such circumstances." Hoyl 1, 123
IBLA at 194J n.9.
107. Hoyl II, 123 IBLA at 194H (dicta).
108. 653 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
109. Sierra Club, 80 IBLA 251 (1984). Confronted with a quickly approaching expiration of the primary term on its leases, the unit operator filed a perfunctory APD, with the
approval of the Department. "Perceiving that an extensive environmental review would be
required prior to acting on the APD, GS then suspended the lease and all other leases due
to expire in [that unit] at the behest of those lessees." Id. at 253. The EIS was combined
with other APDs for other areas. The suspension for the unit included a provision for automatic termination if it was determined that such operations would result in unacceptable impacts on the wilderness characteristics of the area. The ensuing litigation addressed whether
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was mandatory under Copper Valley, and thus, the Department could
not "use the suspension instrument as a vehicle to qualify or diminish
the right of full enjoyment to which the lessee was entitled under the
lease terms.""' The IBLA rejected this argument, holding that the
suspension was discretionary and therefore could be conditioned."'
The IBLA reasoned that the determination of whether a suspension
is mandated must be made "on a case-by-case basis through the evidentiary attribution of fault for the delay.".. It rejected any reliance
on Copper Valley, reasoning that Copper Valley did not involve an
application for a suspension, but rather involved a suspension ordered
by the Secretary; thus, the "fault" of the lessee there was irrelevant."' The IBLA's inquiry, therefore, focused on the factual circumstances surrounding the filing of the suspension application. These
circumstances indicated that the suspension was discretionary. In particular, the IBLA noted that the application was filed late in the lease
term and, regardless of environmental concerns, it would have been
unlikely for the lessee to have been engaged in diligent drilling before
the expiration of the lease." 4 Additionally, "there were known environmental concerns which had to be addressed." Consequently, the
IBLA concluded that the lessee was not "entitled" to a suspension as a
matter of "right," noting that "the operator's inability to commence
to any order,
drilling before the lease expired cannot be attributed
''
action, omission, or delay by any Federal agency. 11
On appeal, the district court affirmed the IBLA's decision." 6 The
court first concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion to grant a

the EIS should have included a "no action" alternative that would have precluded any drilling on the unit
110. Sierra Club, 80 IBLA at 258.
111. Id. at 260.
112. Id.at 261.
113. Id.at 262.
114. Several factors supported the IBLA's finding: it would have been unlikely that the
operator could have secured a water source and installed a delivery system; prepared the
drill pad; delivered and installed a drill rig; and been engaged in diligent drilling before
expiration of the lease term. Road construction alone would have taken too long. In short,
"there was no possibility that the unit operator could be diligently engaged in drilling on the
lease before it expired. The only possible salvation of the situation lay in the hope that a
lease suspension would be granted." Sierra Club, 80 IBLA at 263.
115. Sierra Club, 80 IBLA at 264.
116. Getty Oil Co. v. Clark, 614 F. Supp. 904 (D. Wyo. 1985).
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suspension to preserve environmental values of the leased property." 7
Next, the court rejected an analogy to Copper Valley, drawing the
distinction between a suspension directed by the Secretary, as'in Copper Valley, and one granted upon request."' The court then explained
that, since it 'would not have been an abuse of discretion to have denied the suspension application, it was not an abuse of discretion to
have conditioned the granting of the suspension." 9 The court emphasized that the environmental concerns made it evident that delay was
foreseeable and that operations could not be expected without a lease
suspension. 20 Finally, the court observed that, "[w]hile it is conceivable that under some circumstances a delay imposed by the Secretary
could be so severe that a denial of a request for lease suspension
2
would constitute an abuse of discretion, this is not that case."' '
The diligence and other requirements under FCLAA are only suspended as long as the suspension remains in place. The BLM's regulations contemplate that the authority to terminate suspensions is coterminous with the authority to grant or deny suspensions, 2 thus suggesting that the Department exercises discretion when deciding whether to
terminate a suspension already granted. But arguably any decision to
terminate a suspension cannot be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or not in accordance with law."
V.

FAILED PROMISE OR MISGUIDED ASSUMPTIONS

The implementation of FCLAA appeared doomed almost from the
outset. When FCLAA became law, the existing federal program was in
disarray; the Interior Department had been operating under its moratorium for several years; it had only recently promulgated final regulations
that attempted to facilitate coal development; and the new leasing program became embroiled in turmoil over whether the federal government was receiving fair market value for its leased coal.'24 This tur117.
118.
119.
condition
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 915.
Id. at 917.
The Supreme Court has indicated that federal agencies have broad authority to
discretionary grants. United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569 (1992).
Getty Oil Co., 614 F. Supp. at 920.
Id. at 92 1.
43 C.F.R. § 3483.3(b) (1995).
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).

124. See generally George C. Coggins & Doris K. Nagel, "Nothing Beside Remains":
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moil prompted lawsuits, a congressional inquiry, a short-term halt on
new leases,"z analyses by the Office of Technology and Assessment
and Congressional Research Service, as well as a report by what became known as the Linowes Commission (and the remarks by Interior
Secretary James Watt regarding the membership of the Commission,
which contributed toward his resignation). 6 Coupled with such stumbling blocks was litigation under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,27 industry's efforts at opposing the application
of the diligence requirements, and 2the
environmental community's
8
challenge to the new leasing program.
Shortly after the Interior Department published its fmal rules implementing the new Federal coal management program, parties challenged the new program in court. These broad challenges lay somewhat
dormant once Congress suspended most regional coal leasing in September of 1983, with the Department following along administratively.
The Department once again reviewed its entire federal coal leasing
program and prepared new environmental documents. Finally, in 1986,
the Secretary issued a "Secretarial Issue Document" (SID) and resumed
leasing. 9 Following the release of the SID and, essentially, the re-

The Legal Legacy of James G. Watt's Tenure as Secretary of the Interior on Federal Land
Law and Policy, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 473, 527-532 (1990); C. Peter Goplerud, III,
Federal Coal Leasing and PartisanPolitics: Alternatives and the Shadow of Chadha, 86 W.
VA. L. REv. 773 (1984); David A. Gulley, The Fair Market Value of Federal Coal, 86 W.
VA. L. REV. 741 (1984).
125. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-146, 97 Stat. 919, 937.
126. Coggins & Nagel, supra note 124, at 527-32; GOPLERUD, supra note 124; Gulley,
supra note 124; Martin, supra note 19, at 691-92. The Commission was established by Congress in the Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-63, 97 Stat. 301, 328.
See REPORT OF THE COMM'N, FAIR MARKEr VALUE POLICY FOR FEDERAL COAL LEASING
(1984).
127. E.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981). See generally GOPLERUD, supra note 19, at 55-64;
L. Thomas Galloway & Thomas J. Fitzgerald, The Bonding Program Under the 1977 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act: Chaos in the Coalfields, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 675
(1987).
128. Writing in 1978, then Solicitor Krulitz observed that "[t]he errors and omissions of
previous policies are legion, and have left us with a legacy of procedural difficulties, court
orders, and substantive deficiencies to overcome." Krulitz, supra note 22, at 139. This state
of affairs simply continued.
129. The Secretary had considered four options, and in February of 1986 decided: (a)
to initiate new lease sales in areas where RMPs had been completed; (b) resume all sus-
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sumption of leasing, the program again became embroiled in litigation
Bryant in Natural Resources Defense Council v.
before Judge
30
Jamison.1
The plaintiffs' restructured lawsuit claimed that the leasing program, as set forth in the 1986 SID, had six flaws. It allegedly violated:
(1) the land use planning requirements of both FCLAA and Federal
(2) SMCRA
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA);

by not including "reclaimability" in the unsuitability criteria; (3)
FLPMA's public participation procedures; (4) FCLAA's ten-year diligent development requirement; (5) FCLAA's requirement for submitting a three-year R2P2; and (6) SMCRA's requirement for leasing only
with the consent of a qualified surface owner.13 1 The court responded
first by explaining that the coal lease sales must be compatible with a

"comprehensive" land use plan, but that Congress had not defined the
term "comprehensive." The court accepted the "generally recognized"
view that the FLPMA's planning requirements satisfy the FCLAA
requirement.13 However, where RMPs under FLPMA have not been
developed, the court indicated that the plaintiffs could not challenge the
failure to develop an RMP. Instead, each individual land use plan
would have to be examined to determine if it was "comprehen-

sive.

134

pended lease sales based upon the land use plans then in effect; and (c) to allow emergency
leasing, leasing by application, and PLRA processing to proceed based on MFP amendments.
See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Jamison, 815 F. Supp. 454, 457-61 (D.D.C.
1992). In December, 1985, the Bureau of Land Management issued Instruction Memorandum
No. 86-159, adopting guidelines for diligent development and continued operation, with an
expiration date of September 30, 1986.
130. 815 F. Supp. 454 (D.D.C. 1992). The parties in National Resources Defense Council, Inc. have been engaged in settlement discussions during the pendency of the appeal.
131. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
132. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 815 F. Supp. at 458.
133. Id. at 460. The court used what it described as "indirect" legislative history to
support this view. FLPMA's planning provisions require the development of RMPs, to replace older pre-FCLAA and pre-FLPMA planning documents called Management Framework
Plans. Regulations promulgated in 1979, however, required that the MFPs be replaced with
valid RMPs by December 31, 1984, but until such time they would be amended by enumerated criteria set forth in regulations. Id. at 460 n.30, 461 n.33. These regulations were superseded by the adoption of new comprehensive regulations in 1982. 47 Fed. Reg. 33,114
(1982). The 1982 regulations allowed coal leasing to occur if consistent with an MFP, up
until the MFP was replaced by an RMP - with no deadline imposed. Id. at 461. The next
year, however, the Department of Interior indicated that it intended to develop RMPs "as
rapidly as possible." Id. at 461 n.38.
134. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 815 F. Supp. at 462. This meant that

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol98/iss4/4

30

Kalen: Where Do We Go from Here: The Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act

1996]

FEDERAL COAL LEASING AMENDMENTS ACT

1053

The court then addressed the plaintiffs' separate argument that
FLPMA required that all MFPs be replaced by RMPs, and that the
Interior Department unlawfully delayed replacing those old management
plans.1' The court exhibited concern with the Department's delay in
preparing RMPs, but declined to rule in the context of the cross-mo-

tions for summary judgment until additional information was presented.' 36 Instead, it ordered the Department to furnish a schedule for
completing various RMPs. Next, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that examining reclaimability during an unsuitability review under
SMCRA must occur during a planning stage decision by the Depart' But Judge Bryant added that "[t]he current regulatory scheme
ment. 37

is not ideal.' 3' He also agreed that the Department had to adopt regulations implementing the public participation procedures under
FLPMA, regardless of the substance of any procedures followed by the
agency in accordance with its handbook.'39 He further agreed that the
Department could not grant an extension of FCLAA's requirement to
file a 3-year R2P2 due to a force majeure event.'40 Finally, the court
rejected the plaintiffs' remaining claims; first, that the ten-year diligent

FCLAA did not provide plaintiffs with the ability to challenge all MFPs as a class, regardless of the contents of those plans. Compare 44 Fed. Reg. 46,386 (1979) (ultimately requiring preparation of RMPs), with 47 Fed. Reg. 33,114, 33,118 (1982) (discussing reliance on
MFPs).
135. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 815 F. Supp. at 462.
136. Id. at 462-65.
137. Id. at 467. SMCRA directs the Secretary to review "all federal lands to identify
those areas where 'reclamation . . . is not technologically or economically feasible.' Id. at
466 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(2) (1994)). The Secretary must determine such
unreclaimable areas 'unsuitable for all or certain types of surface coal mining operations.' 30
U.S.C. § 1272(b)." National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 815 F. Supp. at 466. Unless
the United States exchanges these unsuitable coal tracts for other comparable coal reserves,
lessees holding such lands argue that they must be compensated. For example, in Whitney
Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991), the court upheld a trial
court's determination that SMCRA's prohibition on surface mining of alluvial valley floors
constituted a taking of the company's coal property, with a value of over $60 million. Similarly, after Wyoming's Department of Environmental Quality ruled that certain of Texaco's
coal lands in the Powder River basin near Lake De Smet could not be mined, and once
efforts at an exchange failed, the company filed a "takings" claim under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The case was settled during the summer of 1995 for
$24 million. Nadia White, Texaco Wins $24 Million in Takings Suit, CASPER STAR-TRiB.,
Nov. 4, 1995, at Al.
138. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 815 F. Supp. at 468.
139. Id. at 468-69.
140. Id. at 470-71. See supra note 67.
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development requirement applied to pre-FCLAA leases that had not yet
been readjusted under FCLAA,' 4' and second, that
the regulations did
41
owners.1
surface
qualified
protect
not adequately
While the environmental community pressed its concern with the
leasing program, 143 and as Congress and others questioned whether
the Government was receiving fair market value for its leases,' industry challenged FCLAA's application to pre-FCLAA leases. An initial question presented by FCLAA was whether the Act applied to

leases issued prior to 1976. Clearly, Section 3 of FCLAA, by its terms,
applied to pre-existing leases. However, the Interior Department also
had concluded that it could apply FCLAA's royalty provisions and diligent development requirements to pre-FCLAA leases when those leases
45
came up for readjustment.

141. Id. at 470.
142. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 815 F. Supp. at 471-72.
143. A group of environmental organizations also filed a lawsuit challenging the final
regulations, 52 Fed. Reg. 46,469 (1987), implementing the SMCRA unsuitability review
component of the leasing program. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Babbitt, 24 ENVTL. L.
REPORT 20,200 (D.D.C. July 30, 1993). Plaintiffs primarily argued that the unsuitability
review must include "reclaimability" and wetlands impacts as criteria, claiming SMCRA,
NEPA and APA violations. Id. The court held that its prior decision in Jamison decided
against plaintiffs on the reclaimability issue, holding that reclaimability could be examined at
the mine approval stage. Id. Strikingly, however, the court held that the agency's action
under an Executive Order on wetlands was subject to judicial review, and it found "serious
defects in the process by which the Secretary made the February 1986 decision to resume
coal leasing under the 1982 program without adding a wetlands unsuitability criterion." Id.
The district court's decision was appealed, but it was then dismissed under the terms of a
settlement.
144. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
145. "The Department decided as a matter of policy in 1976 to readjust pre-FCLAA
leases to conform to the provisions of the FCLAA, and the question of whether that policy
is legally compelled has not been fully analyzed." Solicitor's Opinion M-36939, Whether
Leases Issued Prior to August 4, 1976, Subject to Readjustment After that Date Must be
Readjusted to Conform to the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976, 88 I.D. 1003
(1981). Five years later, an opinion by Interior's Solicitor William H. Coldiron analyzed the
efficacy of the policy, determining that the new royalty and production requirements were
mandatory and had to be included in all pre-FCLAA leases upon readjustment. Id. at 1012.
Of course, any other conclusion would have eviscerated the Act. As Solicitor
Coldiron noted, then Congressman Max Baucus explained that only a relatively few of the
existing federal coal leases had produced any coal and only approximately half of the westem leases had any production plans for prior to 1990. Id. at 1010. "The purpose of the
lease readjustment is to bring existing leases into conformity with statutes passed and policy
changes made since their issuance." 47 Fed. Reg. 33,114, 33,129 (1982).
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In Rosebud Coal Sales Co., Inc. v. Andrus,'4 6 the court of appeals accepted the lessee's argument that the Department could not
readjust a lease and impose FCLAA requirements without having first
given the lessee notice of the readjustment before the lease period expired.'47 In Rosebud, this meant that the Department could not readjust the lease, because it had given notice of the proposed readjustment
over two years after the anniversary date of the lease. This decision
necessarily precluded the Department from readjusting leases whose
twenty-year period had expired shortly before or soon after the passage
of FCLAA, particularly prior to the holding in Rosebud.4 '
The decision in Rosebud was later "ameliorated" by the same
court.'49 In Trapper Mining Inc. v. Lujan, 5° the court held that
FCLAA automatically converts the twenty-year readjustment period in
pre-FCLAA leases into a ten-year period at the first post-FCLAA.readjustment date. In this case, for example, the leases were originally
issued in 1958 and 1959, with a clause allowing for readjustment at
every twenty-year interval and with the caveat "unless otherwise provided by law...' The leases were assigned to Trapper Mining just
shy of the first post-FCLAA ten-year readjustment date and the trigger
of Section 3 of the Act.' 2 Trapper Mining and another lessee, Wyodak Resources Development Corp., argued that, because the Department
had not sought timely readjustment of the leases in 1978 and 1979, it
could not convert the original automatic twenty-year lease period into a
FCLAA ten-year lease period. This was the teaching of Rosebud, ar-

146. 667 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1982).
147. Id. The court relied upon the federal coal lease and regulations, which together
provided the lessor with the right to readjust the lease terms and conditions at the end of
every twenty years. Id. at 950-51. The applicable regulations expressly provided that notice
of a readjustment "will be given, whenever feasible, before the expiration of each such 20year period." Id. at 951.
148. The BLM noted the effect of the Rosebud decision in the preamble to its rules.
47 Fed. Reg. 33,129.
149. GEORGE C. CoGGINs & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES

LAW § 22.02[4][b][i], 22-15 (1994).
150. 923 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1991).
151. Id. at 776.
152. As in Rosebud, the BLM had failed to send a timely notice of readjustment before
the expiration of the first twenty-year readjustment periods in 1978 and 1979. Id. Yet, here
it would appear from the facts of the case that Trapper Mining acquired these leases possibly so that the former lessee would avoid Section 3's unwelcome effect and it either knew
or should have known that its leases were likely to be governed by FCLAA.
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gued the lessees. But the court disagreed. Instead, it concluded that
Congress both had the authority and intended to statutorily change the
readjustment period." 3
By the time the court decided Trapper Mining, it had become
almost certain that FCLAA would apply to leases issued prior to 1976
upon readjustment. In FMC Wyoming Corp. v. Hodel,4' the Tenth
Circuit already had upheld BLM's imposition of FCLAA's 12.5% royalty rate upon the August 1983 readjustment date of two coal leases

which were issued in 1963 subject to a mere 17 1/2 cents per ton
royalty payment.'55 In a companion case to FMC, the Tenth Circuit
upheld BLM's imposition of the royalty rate for underground mines

upon lease readjustment. 56 Similarly, in Western Fuels-Utah v.
Lujan,'57 the IDistrict of Columbia Circuit Court held that the terms
of FCLAA applied to pre-1976 leases at the time of their readjustment.'58 Furthermore, five months after Trapper Mining, the Ninth
Circuit, in Western Energy Co. v. United States,'59 joined the other

circuits in concluding that FCLAA applies to pre-1976 leases upon
153. Id. at 777-78. The court observed that the language of FCLAA was evident:
The final sentence of § 6(a) states that leases will be subject to readjustment every
ten years after the first twenty-year period ends. The provision is self-executing:
the language is mandatory and directly imposes the new interval rather than just
modifying the Secretary's authority over the term.
Id. at 779. And Congress reserved its authority to impose such new terms, particularly since
the leases were subject to the proviso "unless otherwise provided by law." Trapper Mining,
Inc., 923 F.2d at 778.
154. 816 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1987).
155. BLM sent a timely notice of readjustment, before the twenty-year anniversary date
of the leases. Id. at 499.
156. Coastal States Energy Co. v. Hodel, 816 F.2d 502 (10th Cir. 1987). The court
also held that the royalty rate for underground mines could be reduced below the regulatory
rate of 8% "if conditions warrant," and that BLM failed to consider whether conditions
warranted a reduced rate. Id. at 507. This language was subsequently deleted from the regulations.
157. 895 F.2d 780 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
158. The court framed the question as follows: "whether the mandatory lease terms
provided in § 207 apply to pre-1976 leases when they come up for readjustment after
1976." Id. at 784. In answering that it did, the court examined § 203 and that section's
legislative history as evidence that "Congress intended § 207's 12.5% royalty rate to apply
to pre-1976 leases . . . ." Id. at 787-88. The court, moreover, held that the readjustment of
the royalty rate did not violate the Fifth Amendment, and that the Secretary of the Interior
acted reasonably and consistent with FCLAA in determining the timing of the procedures
used to readjust coal leases. Id. at 788-90.
159. 932 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1991).
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readjustment, commenting that by now it was "not necessary to unduly
burden the libraries of the country with extensive independent discussion of the issues. ' 160
Now that FCLAA's implementation has become somewhat settled
albeit after almost twenty years of overcoming hurdles in interpretation and administration,1 61 it is time to examine whether FCLAA will
serve as sound policy guidance beyond its twentieth anniversary. Any
-

thoughtful federal coal program should weave together in a consistent
and coherent pattern aspects of federal energy, natural resources and

environmental policy. In hindsight, it now appears that the anti-speculation provisions of FCLAA primarily reflected the goals of an early

1970s' energy policy," which was premised, in part, upon encouraging increased federal coal production: a simple "use it or lose it" rule
for federal coal lessees.
Such a philosophy assumed the need for increased production,

some measure of consistency with the country's emerging environmental policy, and either assumed or let energy policy define natural resource policy. But coal development is intrinsically linked to market

demand,

transportation availability

and environmental controls.163

FCLAA implicitly assumed a market demand that never fully materialized, 164 particularly as the nation's fear of depleting its oil and gas
reserves dissipated.165 That assumption, coupled with the newly enact160. Id. at 808. These decisions led to the dismissal other pending cases. DEP'T. OF
TmE INTERIOR, FED. COAL MGMT. REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1991, at 6 (1992).
161. Judge Bryant poignantly commented that "[t]he federal coal leasing program has
suffered continual upheaval for more than twenty years." National Wildlife Fed'n v. Babbitt,
24 ENvm L. REPORT 20,200 (D.D.C. 1993).
162. The same can also be said about the leasing program, to the extent the program
reflects assumptions about leasing decisions based upon the need for coal, aside from concers over the receipt of fair market value. Cf.Martin, supra note 19, at 1038 (discussing
the 1979 program and its relationship to energy objectives).
163. See Horwitch, supra note 10, at 86-94. See also GOPLERUD, supra note 19, at
121-43 ("Transporting the Resource"); McClure, supra note 19, at 692 ("[tiransportation costs
represent anywhere from 50% to 70% of the final deliverable price of coal."). Indeed, the
utilities and coal producers waged a fierce battle against the railroads and the Interstate
Commerce Commission, because of alleged insufficient protection from unfair rates imposed
on captive coal shippers, protection arguably required by the Staggers Rail Act of 1980. Id.
at 692-93. See generally Bagge, supra note 25, at 730-33.
164. For a description of the many inter-related reasons, as well as existing and proposed programs, that affected the national and international coal markets during the early
1980s, see generally McClure, supra note 19.
165. A similar scenario describes the passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,
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ed environmental controls in the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments 166
and SMCRA, 16' as well as the problems associated with moving more
western coal to market, left FCLAA with having little impact on federal coal production, at least until the mid 1980s.161
Although FCLAA began to have an impact after the mid
1980s,169 it was by that time just a footnote to the country's emerg-

with Congress enacting the natural gas part of the NEP "to cope with a severe natural
shortage after the shortage had ceased to exist." Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the
Natural Gas IndustrPfrom Wellhead to Burnertio, 9 ENERGY L.J. 1, 12 (1988).
166. See Bagge, supra note 25, at 722-27; see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM
T. HASSLER, CLEAN CoAiIDiRTY AIR (1981); Peter Huber, Electricity and the Environment:
In Search of Regulatory Authority, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1006 (1987) (describing the
fluctuation between promoting coal as an energy policy and impeding the use of coal under
the Clean Air Act).
167. See Bagge, supra note 25, at 727-30.
168. In 1985, Professor Dan Tarlock observed that:
As of 1984, federal coal still had not played a major role in meeting either total
national energy supply demands or even in meeting total coal supply demands.
Federal coal accounted for only twelve percent of the total United States production in 1982. The program has failed to coordinate coal development with other
government objectives such as environmental protection. The program, moreover,
has not achieved a satisfactory return to the federal treasury. All three branches of
government must share the blame for failure of the federal coal program. The
Department of the Interior's (USDI) attempts to develop a national coal leasing
program failed in part because USDI could not agree on a set of workable and
consistent conceptual underpinnings for the program. Administrative attempts also
failed because of well-meaning but inept judicial intervention and political and
economic events beyond the Department's control. Congress must also bear a good
part of the blame. Congress never settled on a consistent coal use policy ....
Tarlock, supra note 10, at 351. Several years earlier, Tarlock had commented that:
The federal coal leasing program is ill adapted either to serve the nation's need for
increased coal or to further legitimate environmental protection objectives. The program is based on bankrupt conceptual underpinnings, unattainable data requirements,
and the lack of a clear objective as to benefits, environmental or otherwise, that
will be gained by substituting planning for more modest regulation of the market.
Tarlock, supra note 20, at 338. Here, Professor Tarlock apparently was criticizing the planning process for deciding what areas to lease.
169. As of 1992, federal coal production had more than doubled since 1984, with most
of the increases occurring in the states of Utah and Wyoming. DEP'T INTERIOR, FED. COAL
MGMT. REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1992, at 23. Yet, during that same period, BLM only issued
41 federal coal leases, for an average of 4.5 leases per year, while federal royalties more
than quadrupled. Id. at 25, 28. By comparison, 105 federal coal leases were issued from FY
1978 through FY 1983. DEP'T INTERIOR, FED. COAL. MGMT. REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1991, at
24. According to Professor Coggins, therefore, "[w]ith two prominent exceptions, federal coal
leasing has been moribund since 1976. Without drastic change in energy markets, prospects
for renewed federal coal leasing on any substantial scale are dim." COGGINs & GLICKSMAN,
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ing energy policy. In recent years, therefore, the focus on coal production has shifted to an emphasis on making coal an environmentally
competitive resource, particularly after the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990 and through the development of the Clean Coal Technology
program.170 Yet, FCLAA still remains one of the remnants of the
NEP era, while many-if not most-of the NEP programs "have since
proven unworkable
or no longer necessary and have been aban71
doned."'
VI. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?

72

It seems only fitting that after so many years we should examine
whether FCLAA remains a viable natural resource policy, considering
both the more limited role of federal coal development to our nation's
present energy policy and the present emphasis on environmental issues
associated with emissions from coal production. While it is beyond the
scope of this article to undertake such an examination, the following
considerations might help define the inquiry. In 1985, for instance,
Professor Dan Tarlock suggested that the diligence requirements "are
undesirable to coal lessees and society generally.' 7' Due diligence requirements are undesirable, according to Tarlock, because prospective
lessees only bid for coal leases at their present development value
rather than at their maximized future development value, and because

supra note 149, at § 22.03[1], 22-21.
170. See DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGY: POWERFUL IDEAS
FOR AMERICA ONE YEAR LATER 28-31 (1992). See generally REiTZE, supra note 41, at 47679; Donald A. Crane, et. al., Coal and Emerging Energy and Environmental Policy, NAT.
REsouRcEs & ENV'T 26 (Fall 1991); Linda G. Stuntz, The National Energy Strategy, NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 3 (Fall 1991).
171. Julia Richardson & Robert Nordhaus, The National Energy Act of 1978, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T at 8, 62 (Fall 1995).
172. This same question was asked back in 1976, by the Hon. Patsy Mink, who
expressed the view, quite appropriately, that environmental and energy policy need not be at
odds with one another, and thus she supported both SMCRA and encouraged increased coal
development and production. Hon. Patsy T. Mink, Energy and Environment: Which is
Undermining Which?, 9 NAT. RESOURCES LAW 19, 28 (1976).
173. Tarlock, supra note 10, at 358. It should be noted, however, that Professor
Tarlock's remarks were in the context of an essay and review of Dr. Robert Nelson's book.
NELSON, supra note 19.
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such requirements "promote environmentally unsound development
,M4
because they frustrate the assembly of unified leasing blocks ....
But such a concern may suggest too much. First of all, it discounts a lessee's ability to "hold" coal reserves through the establishment of an LNIU, as well as to develop leases in an environmentally
sound and efficient manner through "unified leasing blocks."' 75 Next,
it is based upon a premise that all lands leased under a market driven
approach are dedicated to commodity production and have no other
value, presumably because the leasing process itself somehow reflected

such a judgment.'76 Yet, many, if not most, of the currently leased
lands were leased before the existing leasing program under FCLAA
integrated the leasing process into land use planning.177 It might be
too naive to assume that allowing these lands to be held for speculative purposes is sound policy, presumably because no other potentially
conflicting use - whether in the present or the future *- is appropriate. It might be equally naive to assume that a coal tract having a
higher development value in twenty years is even worth leasing today
7
and will provide a fair return to the United States. 1

174. Tarlock, supra note 10, at 358.
175. When an LMU is being sought simply as a device to avoid the diligence requirements, such "holding" of coal reserves is not necessarily the best use of the natural resources. This is the concern expressed by the GAO and acknowledged by the Department. See
supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text. "Approval of LMUs primarily to extend the life
of a federal coal lease may result in a substantial loss of revenue to the federal government
compared with reoffering the tract for lease." MINERAL RESOURCES, supra note 57, at 30.
176. Tarlock, supra note 10, at 367-71.
177. See supra note 22; see also Leshy, supra note 18, at 496 (discussing the limited
review for pre-FCLAA leased lands).
178. One might ask whether the converse holds true: that it is best for the United
States to hold the tracts until such time as the tracts are likely to be developed and thus
needed in the market? The answer that Professor Tarlock seems to accept, although it is not
clear if he is just relaying Dr. Nelson's views, is that these tracts have no other value to
the United States. Tarlock, supra note 10, at 367-71. In 1984, the Linowes Commission,
addressed whether the diligent development requirement should be retained and recommended
that it should, but subject to a ten year extension upon payment of advanced royalties. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION, supra note 126, at 299. The Commission explained that while
the diligent development requirements allowed each generation to make its decision on the
use of the resource, it also created certain perverse incentives and was somewhat unrealistic
in light of the changed market and environmental controls. Id at 292-99. In 1985, the Bureau of Land Management expressed a concern with the diligent development requirements.
See USDO, ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS FOR AMENDING THE MINERAL LEASING ACT SECTIONS
2(a)(2)(A) and 7 (September 1985).
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Additionally, it has yet to be shown whether a market-based approach to leasing, unconstrained by any due diligence requirements,
could be supported by empirical evidence. At the very least, one would
have to understand and analyze several issues. For example, allowing
speculative holdings of leases assumes that the discounted future value
of present leases being purchased for "speculative" or even future reserves will bring a fair return to the United States. But one would
need to examine whether the value of excess reserves being held for
possible future market demand exceeds the likely discounted net present value that the United States would likely receive from such leases
in the future.
Of course, this analysis may be affected by the holding costs of
federal leases - that is, the amount of annual rentals that lessees must
pay. And such holding costs might be avoided in instances where a
lease has been suspended. Furthermore, the analysis would be influenced by the nature of the western coal markets and the type of contracts being offered by western utilities. These factors all suggest that
anti-speculative and diligence requirements are important elements to a
sound natural resource policy, absent any credible evidence indicating
that the United States is not recovering sufficient economic return on
lands that through a comprehensive land use process have been determined to be useful for nothing else.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Twenty years later, with the federal coal program apparently
emerging from its tumultuous past, FCLAA's twentieth anniversary
should serve as a reminder of where the program has been and where
it is today. Yet, quite possibly, it is also time to explore where it
should go from here. Looking back, it appears that FCLAA endorsed
an energy policy whose climate has since changed. Even when it was
enacted, FCLAA never fully integrated any viable energy policy with a
sound natural resource and environmental policy.
Indeed, Congress passed FCLAA before it could agree on the
passage of environmental controls, whether for the development or
production of coal. Perhaps the irony is that FCLAA built upon the
Department's previous efforts under the MLA, but it assumed those
efforts would work. But this is not to suggest, as some have done, that
FCLAA cannot be justified. The various provisions designed to avoid
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speculative holdings have contributed toward lease relinquishments and
terminations,'7 9 thereby allowing comprehensive natural resource policy objectives to ultimately determine whether, and for how much,
publicly owned coal resources should be leased.

179. As of September 30, 1992, for example, there were only 449 federal coal leases.
DEP'T INTERIOR, FED. COAL MGMT. REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1992, at 16. This is a decrease
from over 565 leases in 1980, with thirty of those leases issued after FCLAA. OTA, supra
note 59, at 238. From FY '92 through FY '90, thirty-nine leases were terminated, while
over 100 leases were relinquished between FY '83 and FY '87. See DEP'T INTERIOR, FED.
COAL MGMT. REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1987, at 74; DEP'T INTERIOR, FED. COAL MGMT. REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1990, at 20; DEP'T INTERIOR, FED. COAL MGMT. REPORT FISCAL YEAR
1991, at 18; DEP'T INTERIOR, FED. COAL MGMT. REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1992, at 16. In
fact, in the FY '88 report, the Department predicted that 55 leases could terminate between
then and 1993, because of a failure to produce in commercial quantities within ten years.
DEP'T INTERIOR, FED. COAL MGMT. REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1988, at 49.
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